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1 Introduction
The so-called Coase theorem has attracted many researchers’ attention for
several decades.1 “Although this theorem has several variants, it says, in
a nutshell, that if rights are fully specified and transaction costs are zero,
parties to a dispute will bargain to the same eﬃcient outcome regardless of the
initial assignment of rights” (Mercuro and Medema, 1997, p. 67). Recently
it has been pointed out by Usher (1998) that in a world of zero transaction
costs, eﬃciency may not only be achieved for any initial allocation of clearly
defined property rights, but also without an assignment of property rights at
all, i.e., “when property rights are insecure and it is not known in advance
which party will prevail” (Usher, 1998, p. 7).2
In this note, following the lesson of Coase (1960), a world of positive
transaction costs will be considered. It is well known that private informa-
tion is one particular form of transaction cost that can lead to ineﬃciency.3
Proposition 1 of the present note will restate this result in the context of a
simple bilateral trading problem with discrete costs and valuations. While
assigning property rights to one or the other party inevitably leads to inef-
ficiencies for some parameter constellations, Proposition 2 will demonstrate
that initially not assigning property rights can lead to full eﬃciency for all
parameter constellations. In this sense, Usher’s (1998) argument will be
strengthened, since in the presence of private information not assigning ini-
tial property rights may not only be as good as any clearly defined allocation
of property rights, it may even be strictly better.
1See Coase (1960). Cf. Medema (1999) and the references given there.
2Cf. also Schiﬀ (1995) for a verbal discussion of uncertain property rights.
3Cf. Samuelson (1984), Schweizer (1988), and Illing (1992).
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Intuitively, when initial property rights are clearly defined, bargaining
between the parties under private information can fail because the party
that has the relevant property right is in the position of a seller (who has an
incentive to overstate his willingness-to-pay for the right in order to sell it
at a higher price), while the other party is in the position of a buyer (who
has an incentive to understate his willingness-to-pay for the right, in order
to buy it at a lower price). Yet, when there is no clear initial allocation of
ownership, so that it is uncertain who will prevail when the parties go to
the court, then a party does not know whether it will be in the position of
a buyer or of a seller with regard to the right. Hence, the parties’ incentives
to overstate or to understate are weakened, which may enable the parties to
reach an eﬃcient solution.4
2 The model
Consider two risk neutral parties A and B with payoﬀ functions
UA = t− xc,
UB = xv − t,
where t is a transfer payment, x ∈ {0, 1} is a decision, and c > 0 and v > 0
denote A’s costs and B’s valuation in the case of an aﬃrmative decision,
respectively (v 6= c). In order to relate the variables to a well-known real
world example, the decision x = 1 could mean that rancher B’s cows graze
on farmer A’s farm, destroying crops. The decision x = 0 means that the
cows do not graze on the farm, so that the rancher does not receive benefit v
4See Lewis and Sappington (1989) for a discussion of countervailing incentives. Cf. also
Schmitz (2002) and the literature cited there for somewhat related results in the context
of the so-called hold-up problem.
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and the farmer does not incur costs c. Of course, the ex post eﬃcient decision
is
x∗(v, c) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if v ≥ c
0 otherwise.
Assume that c is either cL or cH > cL. Following the standard way of
modelling private information,5 suppose that both parties know that na-
ture chooses cL or cH with equal probability, but only party A knows the
realization of c. Analogously, v is either vL or vH with equal probability, but
only party B knows its realization.
As a final piece of notation, let x0 ∈ [0, 1] denote the default probability
of an aﬃrmative decision, i.e. the probability that the decision will be x = 1
if the parties do not reach another agreement. Of course, if party A has the
relevant property right, so that he can make the decision, then x0 = 0. In
the example, the farmer would not allow the cows from the ranch to graze
on the farm if he were not compensated by the rancher. On the other hand,
if party B has the right, then x0 = 1. The rancher would let the cows graze if
he did not reach another agreement with the farmer. In addition, following
Usher (1998), we will consider the possibility that there is no assignment of
rights, so that initially it is not known with certainty who will prevail. It
is assumed that both parties think that each party will prevail with equal
probability (x0 = 12) in this case.
The question is whether voluntary bargaining between A and B can result
in an eﬃcient decision. Using the well-known revelation principle (see e.g.
Myerson, 1982), it is suﬃcient to consider direct mechanisms [t(v, c), x∗(v, c)]
that induce each party to report its type truthfully. The Bayesian incentive
5See e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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compatibility constraints are
Ev [t(v, c)− x∗(v, c)c] ≥ Ev [t(v, c˜)− x∗(v, c˜)c] ∀c, c˜ ∈ {cL, cH},
Ec [x∗(v, c)v − t(v, c)] ≥ Ec [x∗(v˜, c)v − t(v˜, c)] ∀v, v˜ ∈ {vL, vH}
and the interim individual rationality constraints are
Ev [t(v, c)− x∗(v, c)c] ≥ −x0c ∀c ∈ {cL, cH},
Ec [x∗(v, c)v − t(v, c)] ≥ x0v ∀v ∈ {vL, vH}.
The incentive compatibility constraints mean that each party is willing to
announce its type truthfully given the other party tells the truth. The indi-
vidual rationality constraints mean that each party voluntary participates in
the mechanism (at the interim stage, i.e. knowing its own type but not the
type of the other party).
The following proposition says that in the case of clearly defined prop-
erty rights (x0 = 0 or x0 = 1) there are parameter constellations such that
eﬃciency cannot be achieved.6
Proposition 1 If A has the property right, eﬃciency cannot be achieved
if vH > cH > vL > cL and 12 (vH − cL) < cH − vL. If B has the property
right, eﬃciency cannot be achieved if cH > vH > cL > vL and 12 (cH − vL) <
vH − cL. Otherwise, eﬃciency can be achieved.
Proof. See the appendix.
6Of course, this result is reminiscent of the famous impossibility theorem of Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983), where continuously distributed valuations are considered. See
Matsuo (1989) for the two type version of their result. In these papers, only the case
x0 = 0 is analyzed.
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Hence, there is no deterministic assignment of property rights that allows
the parties to reach an eﬃcient agreement for all constellations of the pa-
rameters vL, vH , cL, and cH .7 In contrast, consider now a situation in which
there is no initial assignment of property rights in the sense of Usher (1998).
The next proposition says that in this case eﬃciency can always be achieved
in the example under consideration. Therefore, this proposition is a simple
illustration of the fact that in a world of positive transaction costs there are
situations in which it may be strictly welfare enhancing not to assign initial
property rights at all.8
Proposition 2 If there is no initial assignment of property rights, then ef-
ficiency can be achieved for all values of vL, vH , cL, and cH .
Proof. See the appendix.
Notice that —as usual in the mechanism design literature— the existence of
a Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational mechanism
does not guarantee that the parties’ actual bargaining will be ex post eﬃcient
in real life. But an ex post eﬃcient outcome is at least consistent with
rationality, while following the logic of the revelation principle there exist no
bargaining procedures leading to ex post eﬃciency in the cases characterized
in Proposition 1.
7In order to see that this may indeed make ineﬃciencies inevitable in some states of the
world, imagine that a welfare-maximizing government has to choose the initial allocation
of property rights x0 ∈ {0, 1} without knowing the exact values of vL, vH , cL, and cH ,
while all constellations are possible (or assume that an equal protection clause in the
constitution is interpreted such that x0 may not depend on these parameters).
8Formally, the result is related to Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987). They show
a possibility result for the case of identical continuous distributions. Hence, the present
note is technically related to their paper in the same way as Matsuo (1989) is related to
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
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3 Conclusion
The well-known Coase theorem says that in the absence of transaction costs
the eﬃciency of voluntary bargaining between two parties does not depend
on whether the first or the second party has the relevant property rights.
Usher (1998) has recently argued that in a world of zero transaction costs
not assigning property rights at all may be as good as any clearly specified
assignment of property rights. In this note it has been illustrated with a
particularly simple example that in a world of positive transaction costs in
the form of private information not assigning initial property rights may even
be strictly welfare improving.
Of course, this is not meant to suggest that the absence of a clear initial
assignment of property rights is always beneficial in real life. This note just
demonstrates that there are situations in which the transaction costs caused
by private information might vanish. Other forms of transaction costs have
not been considered. Notice that in real life it is often unclear which party
has a certain right, so that the court has an area of discretion, i.e. its decision
is uncertain. Here it has been argued that this may in fact help the parties
to achieve eﬃciency through voluntary bargaining.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
For brevity, define tij ≡ t(vi, cj) and x∗ij ≡ x∗(vi, cj), where i, j ∈ {L,H}.
Consider first the case vH > cH > vL > cL, so that x∗HH = x∗HL = x∗LL = 1
and x∗LH = 0. The incentive compatibility constraints for the types vH and cL
imply tHH− tLL ≤ 12 (vH − cL) , and the individual rationality constraints for
the types vL and cH imply tHH − tLL ≥ (cH − vL) (1−2x0). Hence, eﬃciency
cannot be achieved if 1
2
(vH − cL) < (cH − vL) (1 − 2x0). If party A has the
property right (x0 = 0), this condition is equivalent to 12 (vH − cL) < cH−vL.
Consider next the case cH > vH > cL > vL, so that x∗HH = x
∗
LH = x
∗
LL = 0
and x∗HL = 1. Incentive compatibility implies tLL − tHH ≤ 12 (cH − vL), and
individual rationality implies tLL − tHH ≥ (vH − cL) (2x0 − 1) . If party B
has the property right, then x0 = 1. Thus, eﬃciency cannot be achieved
in this case if 1
2
(cH − vL) < vH − cL. Finally, it can be easily checked that
in the remaining cases the incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints do not lead to a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2.
In order to prove the proposition, one has to show that for x0 = 12 there
exist transfer payments such that all incentive compatibility and individual
rationality constraints are satisfied. Note that six diﬀerent cases of parameter
constellations have to be considered. In the case vH > vL > cH > cL, choose
tHH = tLL = 0, tLH = tHL = cH . In the case cH > cL > vH > vL, choose
tHH = tLL = 0, tLH = tHL = −vH . In the case vH > cH > cL > vL, choose
tHH = tHL = 12cH , tLH = tLL = −
1
2
cL. In the case cH > vH > vL > cL, choose
tHH = tLH = −12vH , tLL = tHL =
1
2
vL. In the case vH > cH > vL > cL,
choose tHH = tLL = cL, tLH = −cL, tHL = vL − cL. Finally, in the case
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cH > vH > cL > vL, choose tHH = tLL = −vL, tLH = vL − cL, tHL = vL. It
is straightforward to check that given these transfer payments all incentive
compatibility and individual rationality constraints are indeed satisfied.
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